Political Connections, Patronage, and Consumer Attitudes: The Non-Electoral Consequences of Clientelism[*]

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Abstract

How do citizens respond to cronyism and clientelism – not as voters, but as consumers? We argue that engaging in clientelistic electoral behavior imposes reputational costs on firms: by signaling a willingness to bend rules in the electoral arena, such behavior leads consumers to doubt firms' trustworthiness in market exchanges. Using evidence from an original survey and conjoint experiment in Morocco, we show that consumers avoid patronizing businesspeople who are politically active or have engaged in clientelistic behavior. Consumers with political connections, significant exposure to clientelism, and high trust in government are more willing to purchase from politically active businesspeople, however. A behavioral test with real financial stakes confirms these findings. Overall, these results suggest that reputational sanctions in the marketplace are an overlooked mechanism linking clientelism to stunted economic development in cronyist polities.

Keywords: business and politics; political connections; clientelism; survey experiment; Morocco

Word count: 10,502

1 Introduction

The political realm and the private sector are often closely intertwined. Politicians frequently emerge from the private sector, and those that do typically maintain their connections to the business world. In the Global South, this phenomenon is closely associated with clientelistic exchanges, where businesspeople-politicians target fiscal resources to solicit electoral support. While the electoral consequences of clientelism have been well explored, it is unclear how citizens respond to the melding of political and private-sector interests and whether this changes citizens' *economic* incentives and behavior. Can voters respond to clientelism not just in the voting booth but also in the marketplace? We examine the reputational implications of mixing business and politics – and of using illicit electoral enticements – at the level of the broader public and specifically from the consumer perspective. We address a set of key questions regarding consumer attitudes in a cronyist and patronage-dominated environment: how do individual citizens view political linkages when making consumption decisions?[1] Does a political figure's use of clientelistic exchanges in the voting arena decrease trust – and therefore consumer interest – in their product? And are there ways that consumers may insulate themselves from the potential risks of dealing with businesspeople-politicians?

Scholars have addressed this overlap from a number of angles, examining both the private-sector benefits of maintaining political linkages as well as the political impact of financial resources. The former literature includes the study of the economic value of holding political office, identifying both reputational and regulatory benefits that accrue to politically connected firms (Cammett 2007a; Fisman 2001; Truex 2014; Szakonyi 2018). The latter incorporates a literature on clientelistic exchanges that addresses how material resources are deployed to electoral advantage through vote-buying and the use of patronage (Justesen and Markus 2024; Stokes et al. 2013). Relatedly, scholars have found ample evidence that the prevalence of patronage and corruption shapes citizens' political attitudes and behavior, lowering trust in institutions as well as turnout (Chong et al. 2015; Stockemer et al. 2013). Furthermore, while a significant body of research examines the impact of economic conditions on voters' decisions (e.g. Healy et al. 2017), less is

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[1]By *linkages*, we refer specifically to the political connections of businesspeople, consistent with dominant conceptualizations of politically connected firms: namely, firms whose owners or board members hold political office (e.g., Frye 2004; Szakonyi 2018).

known about the reverse: how do politics affect the nature of economic interactions?

In consolidated democracies, work has examined political consumerism: intentionally avoiding or seeking out transactions based on partisanship, ethical position, or a company's societal impact (Neilson 2010). In contrast, how individual-level politician behavior in clientelistic societies affects consumer behavior is understudied. Yet the often weaker institutional environment and rule of law in such settings suggests there may be important substantive and normative implications for developing countries. Beyond the established distortionary effects of elites' engagement in clientelism (e.g. Hicken 2011), clientelism may also create spillover externalities through the negative reactions of mass consumers. If politically connected firms are aware of this, they may compensate for this economic loss by requesting additional preferential treatment from the state; a reinforcing cycle of cronyist policy and clientelistic exchanges may be generated by the reputational costs of mixing business and politics. This suggests the possibility of a *non-electoral* feedback loop between masses and elites in developing contexts. Given that clientelism may bind the economic fates of firms to political leaders – and the resources of those leaders may be tied to the strength of those firms – unhappiness among the consumer-electorate may create pressures on firms which also affect leaders.

We argue that even despite their potential electoral support for politicians who offer targeted goods (Lust 2009), citizens prefer to abstain from financial transactions with such politicians. By demonstrating their willingness to bend rules in the electoral process, political figures that engage in vote-buying lead consumers to believe they will also be untrustworthy in a transactional environment. In an environment where vote buying is common and where politically connected businesses receive preferential treatment by the state, citizens may come to believe that corrupt politics and corrupt business practices are related. While co-partisan citizens may be less likely to share this belief, the overall effect of this confluence of business and politics under weak rule of law is to stifle economic exchange. If so, a large-scale opting out of economic exchange by consumers due to fears of defection by corrupt, politically aligned businesses can segment markets and decrease economic growth (e.g. Fafchamps and Minten 2001).

But certain buyers may be insulated from the risks posed by politically active businesspeople. We focus on three political factors that may mitigate consumers' risk. First, voters with repeated exposure to clientelistic appeals may be more forgiving of businesspeople-politicians. Especially

for supporters of historically clientelistic parties, familiarity with and normalization of clientelism may increase trust in exchanges with gift-giving politicians. Second, consumers' political connections may protect against the risk of defection by the business. Because shared political connections offer a level of protection to buyers, connected buyers may be more likely to conduct business with clientelistic politicians. Finally, consumers with high trust in government institutions may be more willing to overlook the risk-inducing features of businesspeople-politicians. These buyers might view politicians as less inherently problematic or be more confident in their ability to use state institutions to resolve business disputes.

To test whether and how political linkages influence citizens' economic behavior, we administer a survey and an accompanying conjoint experiment in Morocco. Morocco is an apt context for this investigation because it is a hybrid autocracy with an economy rife with cronyism.[2] As such, it provides a plausible setting in which to test our argument, particularly given the high prevalence of vote-buying in electoral politics and the significant overlap between the business and political worlds.[3] Because candidates for elected office in Morocco increasingly emerge from the private sector (Bennani-Chraïbi 2008), consumers must regularly choose whether and how to transact with politically connected businesses, increasing the realism of our study.[4]

Our conjoint experiment asks respondents to choose between two hypothetical deals from firm owners occupying political office. Deals had a number of randomized traits, including whether the owner had an active political position, was linked to the respondent's preferred political party, or had engaged in clientelist behavior in a preceding election cycle. Because political influences may lead some consumers to opt out of an economic exchange entirely, respondents could explicitly decline both deals. Respondents also revealed which deal they believed more likely to go wrong,

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[2]While Morocco is an autocracy, our argument is likely to extend to the many developing democracies where clientelism plays a large role in the electoral arena and/or where political connections influence economic regulation. See Appendix B for a deeper discussion of generalizability; it shows how Morocco falls close to the global median in terms of widely used measures of clientelism and corruption, and in a similar range to open autocracies and even electoral democracies.

[3]Morocco may represent a hard test or lower bound of the effects of cronyism on consumer behavior: it is a place where clientelistic behavior is normalized and where consumers have long been accustomed to the nature of business-political interactions. We would expect even stronger effects in places where this hybrid equilibrium has not yet fully consolidated.

[4]These businesses include a number of consumer goods (for example, current officeholders in the cabinet and legislature are major stakeholders in meat, dairy, oil, and other highly visible markets – see section 3 for more discussion).

which enables us to confirm that lack of trust was the primary mechanism behind the results. This allows us to rule out the possibility that respondents may see benefits to purchasing from clientelistic businesspeople despite the possible risks associated (e.g. Bhandari 2023). In total, we surveyed 2,008 Moroccan citizens, and, with multiple choice tasks per respondent, achieved a conjoint sample of 13,420 profiles.

The results of the experiment demonstrate that consumers clearly prefer to avoid transactions with firms connected to politicians and illicit political behavior. They resist deals with firms owned by both local councilors and party officials, and they associate such deals with greater risk of defection. Consumers are even more reluctant to engage when the owner is said to have participated in vote-buying, but the response is somewhat mitigated when the firm owner is a co-partisan. Overall, consumers consider exchanges with politically connected firm owners to be less trustworthy and more likely to go wrong, especially when owners engage in illicit behavior during elections.

But not every consumer reacts identically to this behavior. Examining heterogeneous responses to political gift-giving, we find evidence that consumers' own political linkages significantly moderate their propensities to engage in trade. Clientelist party supporters, politically connected buyers, and consumers with high political trust are all less likely to resist deals associated with clientelism. We confirm the experimental estimates with evidence showing that these groups of buyers are also more likely to engage in transactions overall, controlling for wealth. In contrast, those without political linkages more frequently opt out of economic exchanges altogether – both in the conjoint task and in a behavioral transaction with real financial stakes.

By theorizing and demonstrating that voters avoid politically linked actors in the private marketplace, this paper makes several contributions. First, the results reveal a possible tradeoff for businesspeople who mix politics with commerce. An existing literature investigates the economic returns to political office, arguing that by participating in political office, businesspeople and their associated firms gain influence over policy, preferential access to state funds, or associated reputational benefits (e.g. Betz and Pond 2023; Truex 2014; Szakonyi 2018; Hou 2021). Other work shows that corporate workers are less likely to invest in political connected companies (Kubinec et al. 2021). Our results suggest that there may also be negative consequences of political con-

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nections in the form of reputational costs with consumers.[5] If so, firms may have an incentive to conceal their relationships with active political figures from the general public. This might explain patterns of obfuscation of political connections in much of the developing world.

Second, we provide evidence that significant proportions of deals may not be occurring because some buyers do not possess the political linkages necessary to conduct business in a risky marketplace. This implies a negative externality of cronyism: large segments of society may be opting out of risky transactions entirely. These findings suggest that policy intended to boost the private sector would benefit from addressing the influence of political asymmetries in the business world.

Finally, we gather evidence of the nexus between voter and consumer behavior in an autocratic regime where such data is historically difficult to obtain and provide both causally identified and descriptive data that gives insight into the complex interplay of business and politics under constrained rule of law. We argue that these results generalize not just to other autocracies but to hybrid environments where political linkages moderate access to the state and thus the risks of exchange. Although partisanship in developing polities is weaker than in more developed countries (e.g. Neilson 2010), it is also more transactional. Our results help to demonstrate the economic impact of these political ties in weak institutional contexts.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we argue why business and politics may create negative economic externalities for reasons that our research design attempts to address. We then describe why the Moroccan political economic environment is an important and useful testing ground for our theory. We then describe the original survey we conduct and the conjoint experimental design we use to evaluate the relationship. Next, we provide the results of the experiment, examining interactions and possible mechanisms before concluding by discussing the applicability of our findings to contexts outside Morocco and possible avenues for future research to explore.

2 Background and theory

Clientelism, or the exchange of goods or services for electoral support (Hicken 2011), is a prevalent political strategy in elections. A great deal of academic research examines variation in the use of

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[5]This is in line with research that demonstrates that citizens have a distaste for companies that make corporate political donations (e.g. Nyberg 2021).

clientelism – the nature of the clientelistic exchange or the identity of the individuals involved – and its impact on voting behavior (e.g., Wantchekon 2003; Mares and Visconti 2020).

Scholars have used a range of creative approaches to study the effects of clientelism. These include the use of natural experiments to isolate the impact of institutional factors such as voting reforms (Baland and Robinson 2008) or election monitoring (Hyde 2007) on electoral outcomes. In studies involving survey data, conjoint designs and list experiments allow researchers to overcome potential issues of social desirability bias and induce respondents to share their true preferences (Frye et al. 2019; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Mares and Visconti 2020). This literature spans a range of contexts and studies a wide variety of electoral inducements. And yet several aspects of clientelistic exchanges remain poorly understood. In particular, citizens' broader perceptions of the impact of clientelism beyond the effect on votes are relatively underexplored (Mares and Young 2016).

A separate literature of relevance to our argument explores the economic benefits of political office to better understand what individuals in the business world gain from participating in electoral competition. Benefits include the potential to use their political influence and authorities to develop favorable policies, evade state regulation, or to gain preferential access to state contracts (Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001; Szakonyi 2018; Diwan et al. 2020). Others suggest a possible reputational benefit, perhaps as a result of expectations that elected members will be able to improve their firms' fortunes (whether or not they can in practice) or simply due to the increased prominence that comes with serving as a public figure. This reputational gain is theorized to translate into economic gains through increased investment at the elite level (Truex 2014).

In this paper, we develop a theory about the reputational implications of mixing business and politics – and of using illicit electoral enticements – on citizens as consumers. This allows us to make two key contributions to the aforementioned literatures: first, we extend the study of reputational effects for politically connected firms beyond the elite level to the broader citizenry. Second, we address an under-examined area in the literature on clientelism, introducing an argument about the broader, non-political implications of this electoral linkage. Linking these two areas of study is appropriate for a variety of reasons. Research on the identities of vote brokers has found that these actors frequently come from the private sector (Mares 2015). Clientelistic exchanges include a broad array of inducements, but many political actors rely on gift-giving – and to do so, they

must have the resources to acquire and distribute the gifts in question. In some cases (particularly with incumbents), they draw on public resources, but often such campaigns are self-funded or run with the assistance of private sector brokers.[6] In other words, business linkages are often a core component of quid pro quo political exchanges.

2.1 Political linkages, vote-buying, and consumer choice

Politicians often wear multiple hats. In many settings, including the one studied here, elected officials maintain their previous employment upon taking office and often have their own business enterprises (Hou 2021). These economic positions can be helpful in mobilizing votes: employers have considerable influence over their workers (Frye et al. 2019), and these business resources can also be used to privately finance the provision of positive inducements during the political campaign period. But there may also be negative consequences. Close ties between business and politics may be interpreted by consumers/voters as evidence of corruption as it suggests some private actors might gain preferential treatment from the state. Additionally, consumers may (correctly) fear that companies active in the political realm are better able to skirt regulation and to prevail in court in the event of a dispute (Bhandari 2022).[7] While existing work from developed countries suggests that consumers seek out businesses based on political affiliation (e.g. Conway and Boxell 2024; Neilson 2010), these are places where institutions protecting property rights function well and where strong contract enforcement is the norm. In many developing countries, by contrast, consumers cannot depend on legal infrastructure to defend their deals (La Porta et al. 1999). In places with weaker rule of law, citizens should thus have less confidence in and more negative views toward firms with political linkages as opposed to firms without such linkages. We therefore expect citizens to be less willing to transact with such firms.

H 1. *Consumers are less likely to buy from business owners with political linkages.*

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[6]This is the case in Morocco, where parties rely on candidates to fund their electoral campaigns and "wealthy businessmen" often engage in direct or brokered purchase of votes (Pellicer and Wegner 2013)

[7]This is true for disputes between consumers and firms, where consumers think about the potential for successful enforcement in the case of contract breach, as well as for disputes between firms (Frye 2004; Lu et al. 2015). Note that whereas Bhandari (2022) focuses on firm characteristics and access to enforcement, this article examines cronyism and how consumers react to firms' past *behavior*.

But what happens when businesses are directly involved in clientelistic exchanges?[8] On the one hand, clientelistic linkages are widely used, and citizens may even feel entitled to such inducements in some contexts (Calvo and Murillo 2013). The existing literature argues that positive inducements are generally more likely than negative inducements to receive a positive response from prospective voters (Justesen and Mares 2019). Yet these inducements also represent illicit actions in most contexts and therefore constitute evidence of rule-breaking on the part of the actor involved. And while voters engaging in clientelistic quid-pro-quo exchanges can expect some payoff (typically in the form of private goods or access to patronage), there is no obvious benefit for consumers engaging in spot transactions with such companies. In a commercial context, then, consumers may prefer to avoid a business that they know to be involved in illicit activity. As with the presence of political linkages, they may also fear that one form of rule-breaking is likely to be associated with other corrupt activity. We therefore predict that businesses involved in political gift-giving during the electoral cycle will be viewed negatively in the consumer context.

H 2. *Consumers are less likely to buy from business owners with a history of political gift-giving.*

2.2 Individual risk reduction when exchanging with businesspeople-politicians

Though the preceding hypotheses outline our expectations that citizens will prefer to avoid commercial transactions that imply potentially illicit political linkages, there may be factors that mitigate these negative responses. These include attributes related to the quality of the item or the deal in question, but also those related to the political linkages of interest. Specifically, we expect that partisan affiliation will play a role in whether political ties or electoral inducements are seen as problematic. In a world where clientelistic linkages lead to a continued quid pro quo relationship between political figures and their electoral supporters during the subsequent political term, voters might expect preferential treatment from their party affiliates, including in the consumer sphere. If so, the negative effects of gift-giving and political affiliations on consumer trust and interest will be moderated by whether or not the business and the individual have a shared party affiliation. Consumers will look more leniently on illicit behavior from a party they support when making consumption decisions.

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[8]This common phenomenon is often driven by the involvement of employers as vote brokers (Frye et al. 2014; Mares 2015).

H 3. *The negative effects of political linkages and political gift-giving will be reduced among consumers/voters and business copartisans.*

We also expect that consumers' political experiences will moderate their attitudes toward businesses involved in political competition. Another factor that may reduce consumers' perceived risk of dealing with political businesspeople is consistent exposure to clientelistic practices. The more commonplace political gift-giving is to one's experience, the less likely it is to make a significant impact in one's decision calculus. We thus expect that consumers who have consistently been exposed to clientelism, perhaps as supporters of parties that frequently use clientelistic strategies, will be less likely to resist trade with political businesspeople who engage in such behavior. This may occur because these consumers have been desensitized to this behavior – they take clientelism as a baseline attribute of the political and economic environment – or because they see it as a positive signal.[9] For both reasons, we expect these consumers will be more open to transacting with a business engaged in illicit political activity.

H 4. *Consumers with a history of exposure to clientelism will be less likely to punish political gift-giving.*

Beyond perceived risks, are there consumer characteristics that help to reduce the risks of defection in dealing with politically connected businesspeople? We argue that consumers' own political connections may serve as a form of protection from future defection. This may be for two reasons. First, a businessperson may be less likely to break a contractual agreement with a politically connected consumer because they are on more equal footing; the businessperson may face political consequences for mistreating a connected consumer. Second, and more likely given that political connections are often not visible, is that connected consumers have better access to enforcement options should the businessperson defect. Given that the availability of enforcement tends to favor connected consumers (Bhandari 2022), we expect that politically connected buyers will be less likely to balk at businesspeople-politicians' past illicit behavior. Connected consumers will have less to fear and should feel more confident in a deal's terms.

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[9]Other scholars have found evidence that participants in clientelistic exchanges develop positive attitudes toward vote-buyers because the exchange demonstrates their capacity to deliver goods (Kramon 2016).

H 5. *Consumers with political connections of their own will be less likely to punish political gift-giving.*

Via similar mechanisms, consumers with a high degree of trust in political institutions may be more likely to willingly trade with businesspeople-politicians who have engaged in vote buying. High-trusting consumers may not view politicians as uniformly suspicious and may see gift-giving as a regular part of the electoral process – or as an innocent or even positive aspect of political competition. Moreover, consumers with high degrees of trust in political systems, especially institutions such as courts, may believe that their property rights will be protected should a dispute arise. As such, we expect consumers with high levels of governmental trust to be more willing to purchase from political business owners.

H 6. *Consumers with high levels of trust in government will be less likely to punish political gift-giving.*

3   Context

The political and business realms are deeply intertwined in Morocco. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, and the economy is dominated by the royal family and historical network of notables (*makhzen*). The state has a long history, dating to its independence, of favoring politically connected families and firms through preferential economic policies.[10] This form of crony capitalism permeates a number of core sectors in the Moroccan economy; it is especially prevalent in the financial sector, where the majority of banks are locally owned and have close ties to the state through the political connections of shareholders and boardmembers (Saadi 2019). This makes Morocco a useful if difficult test for the effects of political linkages and behavior on consumer attitudes: given the normalization of clientelism in the country, consumers may view firms' political linkages as "business as usual."

Historically, cronyist linkages were largely established through bureaucratic appointments,

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[10]This encompasses periods of Moroccanization (following independence) as well as more recent privatization policies, both of which benefited the existing elite class (Cammett 2007b), and has persisted through the recent use of non-tariff protection measures (Ruckteschler et al. 2022).

with the palace selecting prominent businessmen for key ministry positions.[11] Increasingly, however, businesspeople are accessing elected office.[12] Political competition in Morocco includes an elected legislature at the national level as well as elected local councils at the municipal level. Businesspeople are active in politics, in part because candidates are often required to self-finance their political campaigns with minimal external or party-based financial support. Politicians are not legally obligated to cede other interests upon taking office, and many officeholders maintain secondary positions in the private sector.[13] Among the many current legislative officeholders with private sector linkages are several with significant holdings in consumer goods, including retail and consumables.[14]

Moroccan firms with active political connections may benefit in a number of ways that create a relative disadvantage for consumers and those without their own political connections. Such firms are less subject to government regulation or inspection (Kubinec 2018; El-Haddad 2020), meaning their products may be more prone to defect, sometimes with severe consequences. For example, products from a company headed by a two-term PAM deputy were linked to the deaths of two citizens from botulinim toxin; the government regulating agency investigating declined to directly name the MP's company in its report.[15] They are more able to evade discipline in the event of a complaint or dispute.[16] They also receive particularistic access to financing, including "dubious loans and inequitable transactions" as well as preferential interest rates (Saadi 2019). Finally, sectors with strong connections to the government benefit from favorable economic policies that generate financial gains (Cammett 2007b), often at the expense of the consumer.

Money also permeates electoral competition in Morocco. Patronage – the selective distribution

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[11]The rotating door of political-business linkages often saw those ministers subsequently return to key economic roles, including leadership of the General Confederation of Enterprises of Morocco (CGEM), the main representation for the private sector (Saadi 2019).

[12]The number of parliamentarians from the private sector doubled between 1993 and 2002 (Bennani-Chraïbi 2008) and has increased further in recent years.

[13]For example, in a study of 81 politically connected firms in the manufacturing sector, Saadi (2019) found that parliamentarians were controlling shareholders in 17 (21%).

[14]For example, current MPs from the royalist-linked Party of Authenticity and Modernity head major national producers or importers of meat, charcuterie, eggs, and dairy products. Others are involved in the hotel and real estate industries.

[15]See Maroc Hebdo. "Le groupe de Tahar Bimezzagh au coeur d'un gros scandale." 15 June 2017. Accessible at https://www.maroc-hebdo.press.ma/groupe-de-tahar-bimezzagh-coeur-dun-gros-scandale.

[16]See GAN Integrity. "Morocco risk report." 4 November 2020. Accessible at https://ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/morocco/.

to political supporters of privileges or private goods such as access to jobs – plays an important role in political campaigns (Sater 2012). Likewise, vote-buying in elections remains highly prevalent (Liddell 2010) and thus survey respondents in Morocco are likely to have a high degree of direct or indirect exposure to this practice. Reports describe direct cash exchanges during electoral competition;[17] during the most recent electoral cycle, video footage was circulated on social media showing candidates distributing money to supporters. Though the quid pro quo exchanges that characterize clientelistic voting behavior do offer a form of redistribution to voters, they are often associated with negative governance outcomes including lower public goods provision, increased corruption, and increased exploitation of poor and rural voters.

The web of cronyism privileges certain groups and therefore creates losers among unconnected segments of the broader public, provoking popular anger. Researchers have highlighted the challenges faced by politically unconnected participants in the labor force (El-Haddad 2020). Likewise, the widespread linkages between business and politics have prompted popular opposition, most notably during the 2011 Arab Spring protests. While in other Middle Eastern states, protesters called for the fall of the regime, Moroccan demonstrators rallied behind slogans aimed at ending state corruption (Madani et al. 2012). The government engaged in limited reforms following the protests, including passing a consumer protection law in April 2011 (Law No. 31-08), but other efforts to address systemic corruption fell short (Fakir 2017). And prominent politicians continue to receive privileged treatment by the judicial and regulatory systems. Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, an energy sector billionaire, political party leader, and close associate of the king, has been accused of profiting from high oil prices at the expense of the general public; his company was sanctioned for colluding with other fuel distributors in July 2020, but the sanctions were not enforced.[18] Another prominent parliamentarian and businessman prosecuted an employee for stealing a flat of 16 eggs, successfully getting a court in his district to sentence her to a month in prison.[19] Finally, the afore-

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[17]Maati Monjib. "Morocco: Local Elections Bring Victory to Vote-Buyers and a Royal Friend." *Brookings*. Accessible at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/morocco-local-elections-bring-victory-to-vote-buyers-and-a-royal-friend/.

[18]See "Le Premier ministre marocain critiqué pour la flambée des prix à la pompe," *AFP*, 8 August 2022. Accessible at https://fr.africanews.com/2022/08/04/maroc-le-premier-ministre-montre-du-doigt-pour-les-prix-a-la-pompe/.

[19]He subsequently withdrew the complaint under local and national media pressure. See "Qui est Abdellatif Zaim, cador du PAM et 'manitou' des oeufs?" *Telquel*, 14 January 2021. Accessible at https://telquel.ma/2021/01/14/qui-est-abdellatif-zaim-cador-du-pam-et-manitou-des-oeufs.

mentioned charcuterie magnate was more recently accused of withholding salary from unionizing employees in violation of existing labor laws.[20]

Perhaps relatedly, Moroccan citizens have a generally poor view of governing institutions: in nationally representative surveys, they report low levels of trust and approval of parliament.[21] Electoral turnout is comparatively low: in the 2011 and 2016 national elections, 46% and 43% of registered voters participated.[22] This political disengagement may follow from beliefs about corruption within the system, as Moroccans report high rates of perceived vote-buying: 64% of Afrobarometer respondents said voters are often or always bribed in elections, and 23% said they themselves were offered a gift during the 2011 election.[23] The vast majority of citizens believe that at least some local councilors (96%) and parliamentarians (92%) are corrupt.[24] Likewise, the belief that political connections are critical for access to services or employment is prevalent (de Miguel et al. 2015). Ultimately, we expect that Moroccans' high exposure to the negative externalities of a cronyist economy and transactional electoral politics make the country an apt context in which to test our theoretical predictions.

4 Research Design

To test whether voters punish candidates economically – even when they support them electorally – we implemented a survey with an embedded conjoint experiment on a sample of adult Moroccan respondents in August 2021.

We conducted the online survey and associated conjoint experiment by recruiting respondents via Facebook advertisements. This method of recruiting is increasingly used to obtain online samples in the Middle East and North Africa and has been shown to approximate the representativeness

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[20]See Mohamed Farnan. "Eid al-Adha: A parliamentarian from PAM leaves the workers of his company Koutoubia without wages." *Telquel*. 27 June 2023.

[21]Per the Afrobarometer Round 6, 40% of respondents trust parliament somewhat or a lot, compared to 48% across all Afrobarometer countries.

[22]The turnout statistic is closer to 32% when considering all eligible voters.

[23]Afrobarometer Round 6. This places Morocco in the top tercile among countries surveyed in the Afrobarometer (Mares and Young 2016).

[24]Afrobarometer Round 6.

of high quality household surveys (Rosenzweig et al. 2020).[25] We conducted the survey online for several reasons. First, both internet and Facebook usage in Morocco is extremely high. The internet penetration rate in the country is 84.1,[26] and, per Arab Barometer data, 80% of internet users are active on Facebook.[27] Second, data collection occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when conducting the survey in-person was neither feasible nor ethical. To incentivize survey participation and completion, we offered respondents the equivalent of 1 USD in phone credit, which was sent remotely after the survey. We screened respondents to ensure that they were Moroccan residents and at least 18 years of age. The ultimate sample totaled 2,008 Moroccan citizens. Figure 1 depicts the Facebook ad used to recruit participants.[28]

In terms of representation, our sample skews more male, more educated, and younger than the average adult.[29] However, we obtain broad, representative geographic coverage; our sample maps onto the Moroccan population closely in terms of region (Appendix Table A1). We conduct a range of robustness checks in Appendix Section B and do not find evidence of meaningful heterogeneity by gender, age, education, income, or unemployment on our main results, suggesting that the results plausibly extend beyond the convenience sample (Coppock et al. 2018). Full summary statistics on demographic and political attributes are reported in Table A2.

4.1 Conjoint experimental design

Conjoint analysis offers several advantages for this project. It enables the non-parametric estimation of multiple treatment components simultaneously (Hainmueller et al. 2014), useful for testing our multiple hypotheses on political affiliation and clientelist behavior and mimicking more complex decision-making environments. Conjoint experiments can also mitigate social desirability bias

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[25]Scholars are increasingly utilizing this method of recruitment given the challenges in conducting face-to-face research in the MENA region (Kubinec 2021). See, for example, Cebul and Grewal (2022) and Noh et al. (2023).

[26]See https://www.statista.com/statistics/1172770/internet-penetration-rate-morocco/.

[27]Estimated from Arab Barometer Wave V. A majority of users spend more than 2 hours per day on Facebook (https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB_Media_Report_Final_Public-Opinion-2019-5.pdf).

[28]Most ads were targeted geographically at all Facebook users in Morocco. We placed additional ads targeted specifically at women and older Facebook users in order to increase the presence of these demographics in our sample, particularly as such groups have been shown to be underrepresented in Facebook surveys (Rosenzweig et al. 2020).

[29]The average age in our sample (30.4) is close to the average age across all citizens in Morocco (29.5).

Figure 1: Facebook recruitment advertisement

because the multitude of attributes give respondents many ways to justify their choices (Horiuchi et al. 2021).

Respondents were presented with two side-by-side deal profiles for a specific good – either a television or bank account. Each profile included information on five attributes: the political occupation of the company owner, whether the company was based locally or nationally, the cost of the product offered, the political party of the firm owner, and whether the owner had offered a gift to the respondent or not during the past election. These attributes were selected to capture variables of interest – most importantly the political connectivity and party affiliation of the firm owner and prior participation in vote-buying – as well as to reduce the possibility of conflicting interpretations of results. For example, the conjoint design included the cost of the item to demonstrate that even in the face of higher prices, consumers make decisions in line with political purchasing. The full list of attributes and their associated traits are listed in Table 1. Each trait within an attribute had an equal probability of assignment, with no restricted combinations of profile attributes. While some combinations may be less common than others, in practice all combinations are possible. For example, a businessperson with no political occupation who offered the respondent a gift during

Attribute	Randomized traits
Firm owner's occupation	Businessperson solely
	Local councilor
	Party official
Headquarters location	Local
	National
Deal cost	Average cost
	Higher than average
	Lower than average
Political party of firm owner	The party respondent supported in last election
	A party respondent did not support in last election
Prior experience with owner	They offered respondent a gift during previous election
	They did not offer respondent a gift during previous election

Notes: The first listed attribute indicates the reference trait for the attribute, used for estimating treatment effects.

Table 1: Attributes and their trait values

elections could plausibly be interpreted in Morocco as a broker for a political candidate, a common scenario globally (Mares and Young 2016).

For firm ownership, we compare three levels of political linkage: businessperson (no political linkage implied), local councilor, and party official. The *local councilor* trait was included as a point of comparison to the literature examining firm-level benefits to acquiring political office (e.g. (Truex 2014; Szakonyi 2018)); we seek to look explicitly at consumer (rather than elite) perceptions of the "dual role" held by businesspeople-politicians. Such individuals had to win an election (implying some degree of popular support and potential future accountability) but also have direct influence over local decision-making and law enforcement as a result of their position. The *party official* trait was included as an alternative form of political connectedness – a potential vote broker and a representative of political parties, which have an especially bad reputation in Morocco.[30]

For political behavior, we randomize whether the firm owner engaged in gift-giving in the context of a political campaign. As discussed earlier, this is behavior with which many Moroccans are familiar or believe to be common. The trait was worded to avoid implying that respondents

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[30]77% of Moroccans express distrust for political parties, compared to 61% for local government, according to Arab Barometer Wave V data.

accepted the gift (and thus engaged themselves in illicit activity). Finally, we characterized firm owners' party affiliation in relation to respondents' own party affiliation.[31]

Respondents were given four rounds of choices. For each profile pairing, respondents answered two questions: (1) "Which deal are you more likely to accept?" and (2) "Which deal is more likely to go wrong?" Because a forced choice between two potential purchases does not reflect the reality consumers in Morocco face, and because we are interested in whether political linkages lead consumers to fully opt out, respondents could also choose "both deals" or "neither deal" to better approximate reality (Hainmueller et al. 2015). The first two rounds of choice tasks asked about opening a bank account, and the final two rounds asked about purchasing a television. Both television and bank account ownership are common in Morocco, with household permeation rates of 99% and 76%, respectively.[32] These commodities are common, but significant, and we expect that respondents are more likely to care about political connections and behavior in more costly or non-trivial transactions.[33] These goods also represent distinct economic sectors in which cronyism is known to be highly prevalent (finance) or plausible (retail) in Morocco (Oubenal 2019; Saadi 2019). [34]

The survey was available in Arabic, French, and English, but nearly all (99%) respondents opted for Arabic (see Appendix E for how the conjoint appeared to respondents in each language). The conjoint experiment was placed at the beginning of the survey, in anticipation of the higher attrition rate typical for online surveys.[35] Survey questions, intended to measure respondents' political experiences and demographic characteristics, followed the conjoint experiment.

For each randomized trait, we estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) – the

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[31]Morocco is a multi-party setting with dozens of different political parties competing in local and national elections. Later in the survey, we asked respondents for their own party preference.

[32]Estimated using Afrobarometer round 6 data.

[33]Both deals also contain the potential for problems – a faulty TV might require following up on a warranty or requesting a refund from the retailer, and a bank account is an important vehicle for savings and other transactions, as well as future lines of credit – which ties into our theoretical logic about how political connections might advantage a business in consumer disputes.

[34]We also compare spot transactions (i.e., television) to long-term transactions (i.e., bank account) to consider if transaction type impacts consumers' willingness to trade (North 1990; Williamson 1979). In the main hypothesis tests, we pool responses across both transaction types and present the disaggregated analysis in Appendix D.1.

[35]There were 2,008 respondents that started the survey and 1,233 that completed all questions. The average duration for those who completed the survey was approximately 15 minutes. For an exploration of attrition on the conjoint tasks, see Appendix C.

AMCEs for Full Sample: Chose Deal

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. Thick and thin bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure 2: Determinants of consumer deal choice

marginal effect of an individual treatment component in Table 1 averaged over the joint distribution of all other attributes (Hainmueller et al. 2014). We estimate these effects by regressing outcomes on a vector of indicator variables for treatment components (excluding baseline levels). Treatment coefficients reveal the probability that a deal with a particular attribute is chosen, relative to baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level because respondents completed as many as four choice tasks. The unit of analysis is the profile j within choice task k, and the final conjoint sample totals 13,420 profiles evaluated.

5 Results

We first estimate results across the full experimental sample to assess how voters in Morocco behave as consumers. Figure 2 displays the AMCEs for each trait relative to the baseline trait listed at the top of each attribute grouping.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, consumers avoided deals with business owners who simulta-

neously operate in the political arena. All else equal, they were 5 percentage points less likely to purchase from a local councilor and 8 percentage points less likely to purchase from a party official. Both effects are substantively large and statistically distinguishable from zero. Despite this aversion to politically linked business owners, consumers were more likely to purchase from a firm owner affiliated with their preferred political party: they were approximately 4% more likely to purchase from a co-partisan than a non-co-partisan.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that links to clientelistic behavior will reduce consumer interest. Turning toward respondents' past electoral experiences with the business owner, we find that respondents who were offered a campaign gift from the business owner were much more likely – 10 percentage points – to reject the deal. This result demonstrates that consumers, despite perhaps benefiting from a candidate's willingness to bend the rules during election time, avoid them in the business environment. While these politicians may reap electoral rewards, there may be unintended negative economic impacts in the private sector.

The conjoint profile included other attributes which provide a useful contextualization of the results related to political characteristics. The location of the company's headquarters did not have a statistically significant effect on consumer decisions, nor did the price of the product. While we are able to detect at the 90% level an approximate 2 percentage point decrease in likelihood of acceptance if a deal cost higher than average, consumers did not seem to be particularly affected by lower-than-average prices. Of course, this is in the context of a hypothetical purchase where consumers did not have their own money on the line, and cost was framed in relative rather than explicit terms. This null result may also reflect concerns about the quality of lower-priced deals – we show in Figure 4 that lower-than-average prices decreased respondent's trust in the deal.[36]

Hypothesis 3 predicts that political alignment – specifically, co-partisanship between the firm owner and the respondent – will mitigate the negative effects of political linkages on consumer interest. Figure 2 reveals a strong consumer preference against both political affiliations and gift-giving, but more favorable attitudes toward co-partisans. In the top panel of Figure 3, we report subgroup AMCEs on firm ownership and gift-giving attributes by the partisan affiliation of the firm owner. The bottom panel reports the corresponding average component interaction effect

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[36]We also find that consumers were more accepting of higher prices in a long-term versus one-shot deal (Figure D6).

(ACIE).[37] The results reveal mixed evidence that shared party affiliation is a mitigating factor for otherwise undesirable political attributes. Co-partisanship does attenuate the negative impact of offering a campaign gift. The interaction coefficient on *Party you supported × offered gift* is positive and significant – that is, consumers are less averse to gift-giving behavior from a co-partisan. Yet the net effect of gift-giving remains negative for co-partisan and non-co-partisan subgroups.[38] For the interaction with political linkages, interaction effects are small and statistically insignificant: consumers prefer to avoid deals with political figures regardless of the party represented. In other words, even political *supporters* appear willing to avoid transactions with businesspeople-politicians.

One possibility is that the negative effects of politially-linked ownership reflect respondents' general distrust of politicians – rather than their specific distrust of *deals* involving politicians. To study the plausibility of this interpretation, in Appendix D, we separately examine AMCEs among respondents with above and below median levels of political trust. We find that while high-trust individuals were less averse than low-trust respondents to gift-giving and more moved by shared partisan affiliation, they were similarly averse to deals with businessperson-politicians.

5.1 Mechanism: Trust in deal

Our theoretical expectations are rooted in two factors: general concerns about corruption and illicit behavior, and a more specific fear that political connections and bribes might lead to preferential treatment or a lack of recourse in the event of a failed deal. To examine whether these factors are driving our main results, we collected two additional outcomes: (1) perceptions of which deal was more likely to go wrong and (2) trust in the deal.[39] Both outcomes provide a measure of consumers' confidence in the deal being offered. We evaluate these responses using the same approach as above.

The top panel in Figure 4 shows the impact of profile attributes on consumer expectations that the deal will go wrong in some way, and the bottom panel does the same for their level of trust in

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[37]Note that because political party was a randomly manipulated trait, the interaction effects here can be interpreted causally. Full regression results from the interaction model are reported in Appendix Table D6.

[38]This is consistent with a literature on political consumerism and consumption that finds substantively larger effects for negative versus positive attributes (Kam and Deichert 2020).

[39]This was measured using the question "What is your level of trust in the deal?" Responses were collected with a slider on a scale from 0 to 10.

ACIE on Owner/Gift giving by Party affiliation

Party you supported — No — Yes — Difference

Notes: Top panel reports AMCEs for firm owner and gift giving behavior, subsetted by randomized attribute of firm owner's party. Bottom panel reports corresponding ACIE (*Party you supported × listed attribute*). Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Interaction between party supported and owner/gift-giving.

the deal being offered.[40] Both reveal similar patterns to those shown in the main results. Marginal effects for "deal will go wrong" on our key attributes of interest are roughly equivalent in size to those from the deal choice outcome. Respondents view deals offered by local councilors or party officials and those that offered campaign gifts as less reliable, rating them more likely to go wrong by 4 and 8 percentage points, respectively. They also view deals offered by gift-givers as more likely to go wrong (with an AMCE of 8 percentage points). Co-partisanship seems to increase their level of confidence in the deal, though the magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller (3 percentage points).

Similarly, using the "trust in deal" outcome, we find that political linkages and illicit political behavior decrease consumer trust. Co-partisanship with the business owner is associated with

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[40]Note that the direction of our hypotheses varies across the two outcome measures: more negative attitudes toward a deal are reflected in an increasing belief that the deal will go wrong and a decreasing level of trust in the deal.

increased trust, though this effect is somewhat smaller in magnitude. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with our argument regarding consumer attitudes toward vote-buying politicians in a transactional environment. These alternative outcome measures lend support to our expectations that consumer behavior is motivated by confidence in a proposed deal and that political affiliations and behavior generate distrust in the marketplace.

5.2 Political linkages as moderators of consumer choice

We next examine whether respondents' own political linkages and attitudes are moderators of the relationships identified in the main results. We focus here on the marginal effect of illicit behavior in association with a political campaign. Per Figure 2, respondents were 10 percentage points less likely to choose a deal when the business owner had offered them a gift during a political campaign. In Section 2, we argue that exposure (or demonstrated amenability) to this behavior might have a normalizing effect and reduce consumer opposition. We further argue that respondents with political connections of their own should feel insulated against possible negative effects of transacting with a politically-connected business. Finally, related to the proposed mechanism of individual trust in the deal offered, we argue that respondents with more trust in political institutions (including political parties) will be less concerned about gift-giving in elections and therefore less averse to this behavior as consumers.

We first consider the political environment and respondents' individual experience with different types of political appeals. A diverse set of political parties compete in Moroccan elections; some of these make greater use of patronage and clientelistic appeals in attracting votes while others rely on more programmatic efforts. The use of clientelistic appeals is generally correlated with the orientation of each party as pro-monarchy or opposition (Willis 2002). We use respondents' self-identified party affiliation (measured through the question "If the election were tomorrow, which party would you vote for?") as a metric of their likely exposure to this political behavior.[41] Approximately 59% of respondents named a party in response to this question.[42] *Clientelist party*

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[41] It is also possible to interpret this measure as a metric of respondents' receptiveness to this type of behavior.

[42] This low level of participation is consistent with other nationally representative surveys (for example, in the Arab Barometer Wave V, carried out in 2018, 58% of respondents indicated they did not vote in the last election) as well as with actual vote participation in Morocco (turnout in the 2021 general election was approximately 50%).

AMCEs for Full Sample: Deal Will Go Wrong

AMCEs for Full Sample: Trust in Deal

Notes: In the top panel, the outcomes are based on the question: "Which deal is more likely to go wrong?" In the bottom panel, outcomes are based on the question: "What is your level of trust in the deal?" on a scale from 0 to 10. Thick and thin bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure 4: Perceptions of trust in deals

supporter is coded as 1 for respondents who expressed an intention to vote for a clientelistic party[43] and 0 for respondents who named a different party. Note that this coding restricts analysis to respondents who expressed positive support for a political party[44] to avoid conflating disenchantment with political parties in general with exposure to clientelistic versus programmatic party linkages.

We construct two measures of respondents' political connectedness: self-assessed and familial. For the former, we asked respondents to rate their own level of political connections on a scale of 0-10;[45] we code *Connection - Self-Assessed* as 1 for respondents who rated their own connections as greater than 0.[46] For familial connections, we asked respondents to indicate whether any of their family members occupied positions in politics or the bureaucracy, and whether these were current or former posts. We code *Connection - Family* as 1 for any respondent who indicated they had a family member holding a current political post (including MP, mayor, or local councilor).[47]

Finally, we use a series of questions to measure respondents' level of trust in political institutions, including the government (Council of Ministers), parliament, their local council, and political parties. Each institution was assessed on a five-point scale, and we average across all institutions to construct a measure of trust in government (*Political Trust*). We also construct a binary version: *High Political Trust*, coded as 1 for respondents in the top quartile on *Political Trust*. Descriptive statistics for all respondent characteristics are reported in Appendix A.

To test our hypotheses about differential effects based on political experience, we estimate AMCEs within subgroups for each political attribute.[48] We further estimate a model including an interaction between gift-giving behavior and the attribute in question. All specifications include all randomized conjoint attributes; interaction specifications include demographic controls to account

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[43]We use the most recent data from V-Party (Düpont et al. 2022) to identify clientelistic parties in Morocco. For 2016, V-Party coded the Party of Authenticity and Modernity, the Constitutional Union, the Popular Movement, and the National Rally of Independents as above average in its measure of clientelism. On an ordinal scale, all four parties are identified as using "targeted goods and benefits to a sizeable extent in order to keep and gain votes."

[44]41% of respondents declined to indicate support for any political party, consistent with other nationally representative surveys that find low levels of partisan enthusiasm in Morocco.

[45]Question wording was as follows: "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is no connection and 10 is direct connection, how highly would you rate your own connections to influential government or political officials?"

[46]36% of respondents stated they had some form of political connection. Results are consistent and substantively larger when we use a more stringent threshold for coding self-assessed connections.

[47]9% of respondents met this criterion.

[48]We also report marginal means by subgroup in Appendix D.

for possible predictors of political connectedness.[49] Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

In the top panel of Figure 5, we report subgroup AMCEs on the "Offered gift" behavior for respondents with and without each political attribute. While the estimated marginal effect of gift-giving is negative overall, the expected magnitude varies substantially based on the respondent's political background. Supporters of non-clientelist parties were 14 percentage points less likely to select a deal from a political gift-giver, but this declined to around 7 percentage points for supporters of clientelist parties. One interpretation of this effect is that when this behavior is more normalized (or when citizens have come to accept it) in the political realm, it is perhaps perceived as less of a problem in the economic arena.

Respondents with political connections were also less sensitive to the gift-giving behavior. Individuals with an active family member in politics chose a deal involving a gift-giver 5 percentage points less frequently, compared to 12 percentage points for individuals without such family connections. For respondents who rated themselves as having some level of connectedness to political officials, the gift-giving marginal effect was a 4 percentage point reduction in choosing the deal, compared to a 15 percentage point reduction among individuals with no connections. As outlined in Section 2, we argue that this differential effect is plausibly due to the fact that connected individuals have more exposure to this behavior – and their expectation that their connections offer them some recourse in the event the deal in question goes wrong.[50]

Finally, we see a similar pattern when comparing individuals with higher or lower levels of political trust. Respondents in the top quartile in our metric of political trust were also less averse to gift-giving behavior, with an AMCE of negative 8 percentage points compared to negative 14 among lower trust individuals.

The bottom panel of Figure 5 reports interaction effects on the AMCE across subgroups. All differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Because background characteristics are not randomly assigned, these interaction effects should not be interpreted causally as there may be

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[49]These include income, age, employment status, education, gender, and Amazigh ethnicity.

[50]The latter interpretation is supported by our finding of an even larger difference when we restrict attention to the set of respondents that report benefiting from their political connections in some way: for these respondents, the AMCE on gift-giving was small (a 2 percentage point reduction in choosing the deal) and insignificant.

AMCE on Offered Gift by Respondent Characteristic

Notes: Top panel shows subset AMCEs by respondent characteristic for "Offered gift" relative to "Didn't offer gift." Bottom panel shows differences in AMCE estimates (respondents with attribute compared to those without). The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at respondent level.

Figure 5: Results conditional on political linkages

other explanations for the differential patterns. But they do offer important evidence that a respondent's personal experience and political background may moderate how they perceive the mixing of business and politics.[51] Even though the AMCE on "Offered gift" is negative for all respondent subgroups, political linkages to parties that engage in this behavior or to active politicians substantially reduce the expressed aversion to this behavior.

5.3 Political attributes and transaction avoidance

Thus far, we have leveraged the randomly manipulated attributes of economic deals and the corresponding AMCEs among respondents. Here, we turn our attention to respondent background characteristics as predictors of deal choice. We use OLS regression to estimate respondent propensity to choose a deal as a function of personal political attributes, using the same measures as in the

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[51]It is also important to note that these are measures of distinct political attributes, with the exception of the two different measures of political connectedness (Pearson's $r = 0.19$) (see Appendix Table A3).

preceding section.[52] Models include controls for deal attributes as well as respondent demographic characteristics.

Results are reported in Table 2. We find that political linkages and institutional trust are associated with a greater openness to engaging in transactions regardless of the deal specified.[53] The coefficients on political connectedness (both familial and self-reported) and political trust are positive and significant. Respondents with self-assessed political connections were 10 percentage points more likely to take a deal – any deal – than respondents with no political connections. Similarly, for each unit increase in respondents' political trust (on a five point scale), their likelihood of taking a deal increased by 6 percentage points. Collectively, these results imply that in an economic environment with close linkages between business and politics, individuals without political connections are more likely to opt out of deal-making altogether.

Table 2: Opting into transactions as a function of political linkages.

| | Outcome: Chose Deal | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Clientelist Party Support	0.009			
	(0.015)			
Connection - Self-Assessed		0.096***		
		(0.012)		
Connection - Family			0.055***	
			(0.021)	
Political Trust				0.062***
				(0.006)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6,552	10,560	10,760	10,320
R^2	0.025	0.035	0.027	0.044
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of choosing a hypothetical deal on respondent political linkages and trust. All models include controls for respondent characteristics and for conjoint attributes. Robust standard errors clustered at respondent level are in parentheses.

Although the data we analyze are from a convenience sample of Moroccan social media users,

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[52]This analysis is made possible because the conjoint task in our survey was not forced choice and respondents could select one, both, or neither deal offered in each task.

[53]This pattern is visually apparent in the marginal means figures in Appendix D.

the patterns of trust in political institutions we observe are very similar to those obtained from nationally representative survey data. Figure 6 compares levels of trust in institutions obtained from our survey compared to the Arab Barometer Wave V, fielded in Morocco between October and December 2018.[54] Moroccans report low overall levels of trust in government institutions – roughly two-thirds (or more) of respondents from both samples indicated low or no trust in each institution considered.[55] It is possible that the patterns we find above – in which political distrust is associated with opting out of both real and hypothetical transactions – are exclusive to our sample. However, given that low levels of political trust are widespread in the Moroccan population, this may indicate a larger trend of consumer disengagement, with serious implications for economic participation.

Notes: Figure reports proportion of respondents expressing little or no trust in the government institution indicated. Data from Arab Barometer Wave V (2018) and the conjoint survey discussed in this paper (2021).

Figure 6: Trust in government institutions

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[54]Both surveys employed the same question wording.

[55]On average, respondents in our sample expressed slightly higher levels of trust in all institutions except local councils.

5.4 Behavioral findings

Of course, the analysis thus far is based on a set of hypothetical conjoint tasks. Can this interpretation be extended to real-world transactions? To test this, we sought to create an environment with real financial stakes. Respondents were informed at the beginning of the survey that they would receive approximately 1 USD in phone credit in exchange for the completion of the survey.[56] However, 8% of respondents that completed the survey declined the phone credit when offered. We replicate the preceding analysis of transaction avoidance, this time using a measure of whether respondents accepted the phone credit as the outcome variable.

Results are reported in Table 3 and are quite similar to those from the hypothetical conjoint task: respondents with self-assessed political connections were 4 percentage points more likely to opt in to receiving phone credit. There is a similar association with political trust: for each unit increase in average trust, respondents were 3 percentage points more likely to take the phone credit. The 267 individuals who indicated they had no trust in any government institution refused phone credit at a rate of 14%; by contrast, none of the 89 individuals who scored a 4 or above on the trust metric declined the credit. In other words, there is evidence that politically unconnected respondents and those who lack trust in political institutions are willing to forego real material benefits by opting out of economic transactions.

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[56]This is a significant amount of phone credit in Morocco, enough for an hour of telephone calls or 1 gigabyte of internet use.

Table 3: Opting into transactions as a function of political linkages – Phone credit transaction.

	Outcome: Chose Phone Credit			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Clientelist Party Support	0.041**			
	(0.020)			
Connection - Self-Assessed		0.044***		
		(0.015)		
Connection - Family			−0.007	
			(0.030)	
Political Trust				0.029***
				(0.007)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	736	1,207	1,228	1,165
R^2	0.043	0.057	0.051	0.062
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of choosing to receive phone credit on respondent political linkages and trust. All models include controls for respondent characteristics. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

6 Conclusion

In contexts where clientelism is a core feature of the electoral arena, we show that such behavior can also critically impact the private sector. Using evidence from Morocco, we find that consumers resist trade with politically connected firm owners, clientelist exchanges are punished in the economic arena, and some consumers feel insulated from these risks as a function of their own political attributes. We demonstrate that a negative externality of firms' political linkages is reputational cost among mass consumers. This large-scale opting out of exchange can lead to segmented markets and lost economic growth where it would otherwise occur. Without sufficient policy that insulates common exchanges from the influence of political asymmetries, political linkages induce risks that produce significant economic externalities.

These results also reveal important downstream implications about the nature and scope of political accountability under imperfect rule of law. Beyond the distortionary effects of clientelism, our study demonstrates that mass consumers opt out from trade with politically connected firms, especially by out-party consumers. If firms are aware of this, they may seek to decrease the vis-

ibility of their political linkages in the eyes of consumers. Notably, though Section 3 identifies a number of current officeholders with consumer-focused business holdings, the "dual-hattedness" of these individuals was not generally advertised on their public-facing profiles – though these linkages were identifiable through basic research. There may be some consumers from whom it is difficult to conceal these public-private linkages, including those who are more politically engaged or who reside within the politician's district, but we expect that when firms are aware of the potential reputational costs, they will seek to downplay their political affiliations. A second effect is that firms may require compensation to offset these potential economic losses, suggesting that patronage may partially be a response to reputational loss. In short, clientelistic firms that are punished by consumers may demand additional resources and preferential treatment from the state, creating a reinforcing cycle of patronage and consumer distrust. Future work should test this implication directly.

We study the impact of politics on consumerism in a context rife with cronyism and clientelistic exchanges. While Morocco is an authoritarian state, we expect these results to matter in a range of political contexts, including developing democracies. In the many countries of the world where politicians emerge from the business world and vice versa, and where clientelism characterizes the electoral climate, we expect these dynamics to affect the private sector. Indeed, in places where clientelism is used but has not become as commonplace as in Morocco, we expect the results to be even starker. While we consider this paper a first step toward addressing the nexus between voter and consumer behavior in response to clientelist behavior, especially in an authoritarian context where data can be difficult to obtain, evidence from outside Morocco would help to generalize the findings. Additionally, further research with fine-grained firm data would help to precisely identify additional mechanisms by which the dynamics of our theory operate, as well as continue to build the descriptive evidence base for our findings.

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Supplementary Information

A Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we report descriptive statistics from the survey sample. Table A1 reports the regional distribution of survey respondents compared to actual population metrics. We find that, in general, our recruitment strategy generated a sample with broad geographic coverage in Morocco. Table A2 reports summary statistics for respondent demographic controls and political attributes used in analysis of effect heterogeneity (Figure 5). Finally, we look at the correlation across different political attributes used in the effect heterogeneity analysis, reporting the Pearson's r for each pair of variables in Table A3.

Region	Prop. - Actual	Prop. - Survey
Tanger-Tétouan-al Hoceima	0.105	0.098
Oriental	0.068	0.069
Fès-Meknès	0.125	0.140
Rabat-Salé-Kénitra	0.135	0.120
Béni Mellal-Khénifra	0.074	0.074
Casablanca-Settat	0.203	0.155
Marrakech-Safi	0.134	0.116
Drâa-Tafilalet	0.048	0.038
Souss-Massa	0.079	0.146
Guelmim-Oued Noun	0.013	0.022
Laayoune-Sakia el Hamra	0.011	0.016
Eddakhla-Oued Eddahab	0.004	0.006

Table A1: Survey respondents by region compared to total Moroccan population.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	1,228	30.404	10.157	18	76
Female	1,208	0.217	0.412	0	1
Low income	1,004	0.526	0.500	0	1
Amazigh Speaker	1,233	0.221	0.415	0	1
Education - Secondary	1,233	0.256	0.437	0	1
Education - Post-secondary	1,233	0.526	0.500	0	1
Voted 2016	1,380	0.415	0.493	0	1
Plan to vote	1,380	0.570	0.495	0	1
Employed	1,248	0.299	0.458	0	1
Unemployed	1,248	0.349	0.477	0	1
Party Supporter	1,380	0.593	0.491	0	1
Clientelist Party Supporter	819	0.596	0.491	0	1
Connection - Self (Full)	1,320	1.335	2.393	0	10
Connection - Self (Binary)	1,320	0.363	0.481	0	1
Connection - Family	1,345	0.089	0.285	0	1
Trust - Govt	1,258	2.278	1.169	1	5
Trust - Parl	1,270	2.129	1.141	1	5
Trust - Local	1,263	2.021	1.081	1	5
Trust - Parties	1,259	2.152	1.094	1	5
Trust - Average	1,290	2.146	0.984	1.000	5.000
Chose Phone Credit	1,228	0.924	0.265	0	1

Table A2: Summary statistics. Table reports summary statistics for demographic control variables and political experience measures.

	Clientelist Party Party Supporter	Connection Self-Assessed	Connection Family	High Political Trust
Clientelist Party Supporter	1.00	-0.04	-0.09	0.01
Connection - Self-Assessed	-0.04	1.00	0.19	0.19
Connection - Family	-0.09	0.19	1.00	0.07
High Political Trust	0.01	0.19	0.07	1.00

Table A3: Correlation matrix (Pearson's r) for political attributes.

B Generalizability

The survey in this study was administered online to a convenience sample of Moroccan adults recruited via Facebook ads. As with many online samples, the sample of respondents skews younger, better educated, and more male than the Moroccan population as a whole. The core inferences of the paper rely on the randomly manipulated deal attributes, and these effects are well-identified by the conjoint design. Yet given that our sample is not demographically representative of the Moroccan population, an important question remains with respect to generalizability. Would these results hold if administered to a more representative sample? Generalizability is to a large extent a function of homogeneity of treatment effects (Coppock et al. 2018): if the effect identified is consistent across demographic subgroups, then a convenience sample may provide a reasonable approximation of the treatment effect across the population. In the main text, we provide some exploratory evidence that political preferences or income might moderate treatment effects.[57] Here, we test for heterogeneity with respect to gender, age, education, income, and unemployment to examine whether the demographics of our sample might influence the overall treatment effects identified.

Figure B1 depicts the AMCEs from the main choice outcome, subsetted by respondent gender (top panel) and age (bottom panel). Gender subsets include male, female, and NA (respondents who selected "prefer not to answer" or exited the survey before reaching the demographic questions). Age subsets include respondents above and below the median age in our sample of 28, as well as those with missing data. In general, we find that effects are consistent across subgroups: the coefficient direction is consistent for all subgroups and effects of interest (firm owner, party, and gift-giving behavior). There is little evidence that gender is associated with differential treatment effects: although the magnitude of the coefficient varies somewhat across subgroups, there are no significant interaction effects. For age, coefficient sign is again consistent across subgroups. There is one significant interaction effect: older respondents were less moved by a co-partisan firm owner than younger respondents.

Figure B2 reports the same analysis, here subsetted by respondent education (top panel) and income (bottom panel). Education is subsetted for respondents above and below the median education level in our sample (some post-secondary education), as well as those missing data. Income is subsetted for respondents above or below the median income level reported (2500 MAD monthly) or missing. Again, we find that effects are consistent across subgroups. Though coefficient size

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[57]Though our sample likely does not accurately capture the full range of economic demographics in Morocco, it seems to provide a plausible snapshot of political preferences. The survey was administered a few months prior to local and legislative elections. We find that the breakdown of partisan preferences expressed by respondents is largely consistent with the voting results from the 2021 elections.

AMCEs by Gender: Chose Deal

AMCEs by Age: Chose Deal

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. In the top panel, effects are subsetted by respondent gender (female, male, and missing/prefer not to answer). In the bottom panel, effects are subsetted by respondent age (at or below the median of 28, above the median, and missing/prefer not to answer).

Figure B1: Determinants of consumer deal choice by respondent gender and age.

varies somewhat by subset, the sign is consistent for all key attributes of interest. These results generally supply support for the idea that the effects identified would largely generalize to a more representative sample of the Moroccan adult population: regardless of demographics, respondents

are consistently averse to deals involving businesspeople-politicians or those involved in clientelistic transactions and more open to those involving co-partisans.


Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. In the top panel, effects are subsetted by respondent education (post-secondary, secondary or below, and missing/prefer not to answer). In the bottom panel, effects are subsetted by respondent income (at or below the median of 2500 MAD monthly, above the median, and missing/prefer not to answer).

Figure B2: Determinants of consumer deal choice by respondent education and income.

Figure B3 reports the same analysis, now subsetted by whether or not respondents reported

being unemployed looking for work. As with many online surveys, the rate of unemployment in the survey sample here is higher than among the Moroccan population as a whole (estimated at 12% in 2021). Yet again, there is little evidence that the conjoint treatment effects vary substantially with this attribute; AMCE estimates have the same sign for all conjoint attributes and are comparable in size and significance across subgroups.

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. In this figure, effects are subsetted by whether or not respondents reported being unemployed.

Figure B3: Determinants of consumer deal choice by respondent unemployment.

To contextualize the findings—and to show that Morocco is not an outlier—it is useful to situate Morocco relative to other countries on measures of corruption and clientelism. Figure B4 plots V-Dem indices for corruption and clientelism. As it shows, Morocco scores slightly above the global median on each dimension, placing it near the center of the distribution of all regime types apart from liberal democracies. Its position near this middle cluster suggests that it is neither an outlier nor an especially extreme case of cronyism or clinetelism; rather, we argue it is broadly representative of the kinds of polities where corruption and clientelism are strong presences but not necessarily all-encompassing. That Morocco is surrounded by other closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, and even electoral democracies underscores that our results may have relevance beyond this single case. Morocco's ranking near the median in Transparency International's Corruption Index (99/180) further reinforces this point. More genreally, the mechanisms we theorize in this article are not specific to Morocco: they are likely to apply in the many contexts where firms straddle the business world and clientelistic politics.

Notes: Source: V-Dem indices on corruption and clientelism.

Figure B4: Morocco in broader context

C Attrition

Next, we consider the issue of attrition. Respondents self-selected into the survey by clicking on ads for a survey about politics and commerce. They were informed at the beginning of the survey that they would receive a small amount of phone credit upon completion. Yet their participation was entirely voluntary, and many respondents exited the sample without completing the full survey. This attrition was largely concentrated during the conjoint task: respondents were given four conjoint tasks to complete, and around 10% dropped out of the survey with each round (Table C4). Frontloading the survey instrument with the conjoint tasks ensured a larger *n* for the effects of interest, but the repeated choice tasks may have dissuaded some respondents from continuing.[58] Of the 1399 respondents who completed all four choice tasks, an additional 166 attrited during the subsequent political and demographic questions.

This represents a high rate of overall attrition but is perhaps unsurprising given the format in which the survey was conducted and its voluntary aspect. The core concern with attrition in es-

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[58]We did not inform respondents in advance about the total number of choice tasks.

Passed screening questions	2297	100%
Completed first conjoint task	2008	87%
Completed second conjoint task	1760	77%
Completed third conjoint task	1543	67%
Completed fourth conjoint task	1399	61%
Completed full survey	1233	54%

Notes: Table indicates the total number of survey takers who completed each survey benchmark, as well as the percentage relative to those who consented and passed the screening eligibility questions.

Table C4: Attrition throughout survey.

timating causally identified effects is that the missingness on outcome variables is non-random: attriters and their response to treatment might differ systematically from non-attriters, biasing the result estimates. Because demographic questions were asked after the choice tasks, we cannot compare demographic attributes for attriters and non-attriters. However, because respondents were asked to complete multiple tasks, we can compare AMCEs for those who dropped out after completing at least one task (609 unique respondents) to those who completed all four tasks (1399 unique respondents). This allows us to offer insight into whether the missingness is *independent of potential outcomes*, which would alleviate concerns of missingness-induced bias in estimated effects.

Figure C5 depicts this comparison. The coefficients on firm owner, party affiliation, and gift-giving are all in the same direction across both groups of respondents and offer largely similar intuitions. In all cases, the standard error for the attrited group is larger (unsurprising, given that this group is smaller in size). The only effect that is statistically distinguishable in an interaction model is that on gift-giving: attriters were less likely than non-attriters to reject a deal involving a gift-giver (though the effect was negative and statistically significant for both groups). Collectively, this provides support for the idea that the estimated effects would not substantively change with more complete data.

D Additional Analyses

D.1 Separating by transactional relationship length

The conjoint design also sought to test whether respondents react differently depending on the nature of the deal. Research on the emergence of economic institutions suggest that repeated interactions can lead to folk-theorem results of self-sustaining trading equilibria (e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin 2009; Greif 1989; North 1990), but in the context of consumers dealing with potentially corrupt economic agents, long-term relationships may also introduce more opportunities for seller moral hazard (Bhandari 2022). Due to these risks, we might thus expect respondents to differentially seek one-shot deals rather than longer-term transactions. To assess this in the conjoint experimental framework, we separately asked respondents to evaluate the sale of a television (a one-shot deal) versus banking services (a long-term, repeated transaction). The results, presented in Figure D6, show that Moroccans indeed are less likely to enter longer-term economic relationships with party officials compared to regular businesspeople. Interestingly, local councilors are

AMCEs by Attrition: Chose Deal

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. Effects are subsetted by whether respondents completed all four choice tasks (unattrited) or dropped out of the survey after completing one or more choice tasks (attrited).

Figure C5: Determinants of consumer deal choice by respondent attrition.

avoided at substantively the same rates despite the nature of the transaction.

D.2   Marginal Means

In this section we report marginal means for attributes from the conjoint choice task. The task was not forced choice, and respondents could indicate interest in neither or both deals offered. Figure D7 shows marginal means for each conjoint attribute across the full sample. The subsequent figures depict marginal means for each attribute, subsetted based on respondents' political attributes.

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. The one-shot transaction involved the purchase of a TV, while the long-term relationship involved the selection of a bank account. Thick and thin bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure D6: Determinants of consumer deal choice by product type

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" Marginal means for conjoint traits are on the horizontal axis.

Figure D7: Marginal means (full sample)

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" Marginal means for conjoint traits are on the horizontal axis and are subset by whether the respondent indicated support for a clientelistic party or a non-clientelistic party.

Figure D8: Marginal means (clientelist support)

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" Marginal means for conjoint traits are on the horizontal axis and are subset by whether or not the respondent had familial political connections.

Figure D9: Marginal means (familial political connections)

Marginal Means by Respondent Political Connections

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" Marginal means for conjoint traits are on the horizontal axis and are subset by whether or not the respondent described themselves as politically connected.

Figure D10: Marginal means (self-assessed connections)


Marginal Means by Respondent Political Trust

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" Marginal means for conjoint traits are on the horizontal axis and are subset by whether or not the respondent was in the top quartile for aggregate political trust.

Figure D11: Marginal means (political trust)

D.3 Separating by political trust

One aspect of our conjoint design examines the consumer response to businessperson-politicians. We theorize that as consumers, citizens may fear being disadvantaged in a transaction involving a firm with one foot in the political realm. In the main results in Figure 2, we find that this expectation is borne out: respondents were less likely to take a deal when the firm owner was also a politician. A possible concern is that, rather than identifying a consumer-specific response, this effect reflects overall negative attitudes toward politicians. To address this concern, in Figure D12 we separately examine AMCEs across subsamples with high and low levels of political trust.[59]

We find that respondents' levels of political trust cannot account for the negative impact of politician ownership on deal-making. While respondents with higher trust in politicians were moderately less averse to deals involving party officials or local councilmembers, the estimated AMCEs remained negative and statistically significant.

Notes: The outcome is based on the question: "Which deal are you more likely to choose?" The change in probability of a deal being chosen, relative to the baseline attribute trait, is on the horizontal axis. This analysis reports AMCEs by subsample, based on whether respondents reported a level of political trust above or below the median. Thick and thin bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure D12: Determinants of consumer deal choice by political trust

D.4 Full Regression Results

In this section, we report full output from regressions reported in the main text, including coefficient estimates for independent variables of interest and all controls.

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[59]Our measure of political trust captures attitudes toward politicians, including the Moroccan parliament and the local council in respondent's municipality.

Table D5: Regression Output: Figures 2 and 5.1.

	Dependent variable:		
	Chose Deal	Deal will go wrong	Trust in deal
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Owner: Councillor	−0.050***	0.037***	−0.257***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.075)
Owner: Party official	−0.088***	0.079***	−0.549***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.070)
HQ: National	0.012	−0.002	0.090
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.065)
Cost: Higher than average	−0.018*	0.012	−0.029
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.067)
Cost: Lower than average	−0.008	−0.002	−0.117*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.066)
Party: Party you supported	0.041***	−0.030***	0.080
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.057)
Gift-giving: Offered gift	−0.100***	0.080***	−0.418***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.060)
Constant	0.467***	0.392***	4.335***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.089)
Observations	13,420	13,420	13,420

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of choosing deal, belief that deal will go wrong, and trust in deal on randomized conjoint attributes. Robust standard errors clustered at respondent level are in parentheses.

Table D6: Regression Output: Figure 3.

	Dependent variable:	
	Outcome: Chose Deal	
	(1)	(2)
Owner: Councillor	−0.051***	−0.060***
	(0.012)	(0.015)
Owner: Party official	−0.089***	−0.080***
	(0.011)	(0.015)
HQ: National	0.011	0.012
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Cost: Higher	−0.018*	−0.018*
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Cost: Lower	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Party you supported	0.022*	0.040***
	(0.012)	(0.015)
Offered Gift	−0.118***	−0.100***
	(0.012)	(0.009)
Party you supported x Offered gift	0.038**	
	(0.017)	
Party you supported x Councillor		0.019
		(0.020)
Party you supported x Party official		−0.017
		(0.021)
Constant	0.477***	0.468***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Observations	13,420	13,420
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of choosing deal on randomized conjoint attributes, including interactions between party supported and both owner and campaign gift-giving attributes. Robust standard errors clustered at respondent level are in parentheses.

Table D7: Regression Output: Figure 5, top panel, models 1-4.

	Chose Deal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Owner: Councillor	−0.076***	−0.047*	−0.078*	−0.046***
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.014)
Owner: Party official	−0.107***	−0.070***	−0.081*	−0.079***
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.013)
HQ: National	0.020	−0.011	0.015	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.012)
Cost: Higher than average	−0.018	−0.012	0.010	−0.018
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.013)
Cost: Lower than average	−0.005	−0.022	0.008	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.012)
Party: Party you supported	0.072***	0.040**	0.075**	0.041***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.010)
Gift-giving: Offered gift	−0.067***	−0.145***	−0.047	−0.116***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.011)
Constant	0.503***	0.534***	0.468***	0.477***
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.016)
Subset:	Clientelist	Non-Clientelist	Family Connection	No Family Connection
Observations	3,904	2,648	960	9,800

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D8: Regression Output: Figure 5, top panel, models 5-8.

	Chose Deal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Owner: Councillor	−0.044*	−0.057***	−0.046*	−0.055***
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Owner: Party official	−0.074***	−0.089***	−0.051*	−0.096***
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.014)
HQ: National	0.003	0.015	−0.004	0.024*
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Cost: Higher than average	−0.002	−0.024*	−0.030	−0.014
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.013)
Cost: Lower than average	−0.025	0.003	−0.007	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.014)
Party: Party you supported	0.061***	0.031**	0.054***	0.043***
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Gift-giving: Offered gift	−0.044***	−0.147***	−0.077***	−0.127***
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Constant	0.496***	0.470***	0.538***	0.469***
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.017)
Subset:	Self-Assessed Connection	No Self-Assessed Connection	High Political Trust	No High Political Trust
Observations	3,832	6,728	2,544	7,776

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D9: Regression Output: Figure 5, bottom panel.

	Dependent variable:			
	Chose Deal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Clientelist Party Supporter	−0.030			
	(0.020)			
Family Connection		0.019		
		(0.026)		
Self-Assessed Connection			0.045***	
			(0.016)	
High Political Trust				0.070***
				(0.018)
Gift-giving: Offered gift	−0.142***	−0.115***	−0.145***	−0.125***
	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Owner: Councillor	−0.063***	−0.049***	−0.052***	−0.052***
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Owner: Party official	−0.092***	−0.080***	−0.084***	−0.086***
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
HQ: National	0.010	0.014	0.012	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Cost: Higher than average	−0.014	−0.015	−0.015	−0.017
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Cost: Lower than average	−0.012	−0.009	−0.007	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Party: Party you supported	0.059***	0.045***	0.042***	0.046***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.017	−0.011	−0.007	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Amazigh Speaker	0.007	0.016	0.011	0.025*
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Secondary education	−0.011	−0.009	−0.005	−0.011
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Post-secondary education	0.0002	−0.010	−0.011	−0.006
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Employed	0.001	−0.013	−0.018	−0.014
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Low income	−0.016	−0.015	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Clientelist x Offered gift	0.077***			
	(0.029)			
Family x Offered gift		0.069**		
		(0.035)		
Self-Assessed x Offered gift			0.102***	
			(0.022)	
High trust x Offered gift				0.049**
				(0.024)
Constant	0.661***	0.617***	0.599***	0.595***
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Observations	6,552	10,760	10,560	10,320

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of choosing deal on randomized conjoint attributes, interacting gift-giving behavior with political attribute of interest. Models include controls for respondent demographics. Robust standard errors clustered at respondent level are in parentheses.

Table D10: Regression Output: Table 2, including controls.

			Dependent variable:	
			Chose Deal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Clientelist Party Support	0.009			
	(0.015)			
Connection - Self-Assessed		0.096***		
		(0.012)		
Connection - Family			0.055***	
			(0.021)	
Political Trust				0.062***
				(0.006)
Owner: Councillor	−0.063***	−0.052***	−0.048***	−0.051***
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Owner: Party official	−0.093***	−0.085***	−0.080***	−0.085***
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
HQ: National	0.011	0.013	0.014	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Cost: Higher than average	−0.014	−0.015	−0.014	−0.017
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Cost: Lower than average	−0.011	−0.008	−0.008	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Party: Party you supported	0.059***	0.044***	0.045***	0.047***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Behavior: Offered gift	−0.097***	−0.108***	−0.109***	−0.113***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.015	−0.007	−0.011	−0.007
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Amazigh Speaker	0.007	0.013	0.017	0.025*
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Secondary education	−0.012	−0.005	−0.009	−0.017
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Post-secondary education	−0.0005	−0.010	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Employed	0.001	−0.017	−0.013	−0.015
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Low income	−0.016	−0.014	−0.015	−0.013
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Constant	0.639***	0.579***	0.613***	0.475***
	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6,552	10,560	10,760	10,320
R^2	0.025	0.035	0.027	0.044

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of choosing a hypothetical deal on respondent political linkages and trust. All models include controls for respondent characteristics and for conjoint attributes. Robust standard errors clustered at respondent level are in parentheses.

E   Conjoint Examples

Figure E13: Example of conjoint text - English

العربية ⌄

تخيل أنك تنوي فتح حساب بنكي جديد. أمامك الخياران أدناه:

	الحساب البنكي 1	الحساب البنكي 2
مالك الشركة	رجل أعمال	مسؤول حزب سياسي
المقر	وطني	محلي
التكلفة	أعلى من المتوسط	أقل من المتوسط
الحزب السياسي	حزب لم تؤيده في الانتخابات الأخيرة	حزب لم تؤيده في الانتخابات الأخيرة
التجربة مع المالك	لم يقدم لك هدية في حملة سياسية	لم يقدم لك هدية في حملة سياسية

ما هو الحساب البنكي الذي ستختاره غالبا؟

○	الحساب البنكي 1
○	الحساب البنكي 2
○	كلاهما
○	لا هذا ولا ذاك

Figure E14: Example of conjoint text - Arabic

Imaginez que vous cherchez à ouvrir un nouveau compte bancaire. Vous recevez les deux options ci-dessous :

	Compte bancaire 1	Compte bancaire 2
Propriétaire d'entreprise	Homme d'affaires	Homme d'affaires
Siège	National	Local
Coût	Inférieur au coût moyen	Supérieur au coût moyen
Parti politique	Un parti que vous avez soutenu lors des dernières élections	Un parti que vous n'avez pas soutenu lors des dernières élections
Votre expérience avec le propriétaire	Ils ne vous ont pas offert un cadeau lors de la campagne électorale	Ils ne vous ont pas offert un cadeau lors de la campagne électorale

Quel compte bancaire êtes-vous le plus susceptible à choisir ?

○ Compte bancaire 1

○ Compte bancaire 2

○ Les deux

○ Aucun

Figure E15: Example of conjoint text - French